Following the Constitution Convention of 1787, the next order of business was to present the proposed Constitution to the States for ratification, and more importantly, convince a skeptical public that is should be ratified. From this two main groups formed, one called the Federalist with the other being the Anti-Federalist. Each wrote numerous Articles either for or against the Ratification of the Constitution. For the Federalist, the Federalist Papers are by far the most commonly known writings attributed to the Federalist, though other Pro-Federalist writings did also get published.
The Federalist Papers were written by three individuals, James Madison [Convention Delegate from Virginia, future Representative from Virginia and 4th President], Alexander Hamilton [Convention Delegate from New York, future Secretary of the Treasury under Washington] and John Jay [Negotiator in the Treaty of Paris ending the American Revolution, future First Chief Justice of the United States and Governor of New York]. The Federalist Papers in many aspects were quite thorough in their arguments for Ratification, addressing most provisions in the proposed Constitution and presenting their intended actions and presenting a meaning of the context to the people mainly of New York, but much of the Country in the end. During the nearly year long run of these Papers, many of the Papers were written solely to explain the proposed Constitution, while others also addressed concerns brought up by the Anti-federalist. Of the 85 Federalist Papers published from October 1787 until August 1788, five were written by Jay, and the remaining 80 by Hamilton and Madison [not all can be attributed to specifically one of the two]. Though “general welfare” in some form would be mentioned a few times in early articles, it was specifically in reference to the purpose of the Constitution or used as a general term [Federalist No. 1, 12, 18, 22, 23, 26, 33, 34] it was not until Federalist No. 41 written by James Madison, did Article I Section 8 Clause 1 would be itself addressed and along with it “General Welfare”.
- Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States," amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for the general welfare."
James Madison one of the most influential delegates to the Convention, one of the primary authors of the Virginia Plan presented in the Convention, and later one of the leading forces in the Bill of Rights, here asserts that the “general welfare” provision must be, not can be, “singularly expressed by the terms “to raise money for the general welfare”,”. This brings us back to the arguments first described in Part 1, what did the term mean? Though this instance does not describe what “general welfare” means, it does definitively describe what it is not, a broad power to make law. Madison here unequivocally ties it to only the raising of money, which the entire clause as whole entails.
- The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
Madison also states earlier on, “Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it”. Here he is stating that specific powers are enumerated or defined, and the fact they are listed denies credence to the dissenting argument on the clause’s meaning. Madison is implying, why would such a broad power be put in place and than be followed by enumerated or defined powers which would by the opposing concept of general welfare[broad power] would be part of general welfare in the first place? The implication is, that general welfare is NOT a broad power, but is limited to taxing only, and the powers Congress does have are specifically enumerated and defined following clause 1. As was pointed out in Part 1, this same term used in a similar way conveyed no power to the Congress Assembled, and just such is summed up by Madison at the end of Federalist No 41.
- The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language used by the convention is a copy from the articles of Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as described in article third, are "their common defense, security of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare." The terms of article eighth are still more identical: "All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury," etc. A similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe either of these articles by the rules which would justify the construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defense and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves, whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now make use of against the convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation!
Madison again mentions General Welfare in Federalist 45, but this is passing general reference of the overall Common Defense and General welfare in regards to the new taxation powers in the Constitution, and is not specifically addressing the provision, rather a general purpose statement. General welfare of some similar form is also used in Federalist No. 46 and 61, also in general context. The final mentioning of general welfare in any context in the Federal Papers was in Federalist No. 63, but in this final use of general welfare in the Federalist Papers, it is once again simple descriptive use on what the responsibility of government is, to ensure the general welfare as a descriptive term, and not one that conveys power.
Even in the the final paper, Federalist No. 85 by Hamilton, addressing some of the final concerns of the Anti-Federalist that had yet to be addressed, never refereed to General Welfare, nor to Article I Section 8 in the entire paper. The single biggest concern for the Anti-Federalist was in the forming of a Federal Government that carried too much power, and the Federalist wished to relieve these concern. But in the end, so little was thought of the term general welfare as a potential or real threat of abuse of power that it warranted only a couple paragraphs of explaining, in only one paper, never to be directly mentioned again, over the entire series of 85 writings over nearly a one year period. to quell the publics concerns and explain the new Constitution, and was sufficient to cause New York to carry ratification by a narrow 30-27 margin.
Part 1 : Part 2 : Part 3: Part 4 : Part 5 : Part 6 : Part 7 : Part 8 : Part 9
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