This is the Notes of the Convention of 1787 (The Federal Convention) for June 1, 1787. The notes included are those that specifically address this day, and do not include notes of others who may address the topics of the day. You can download and read those, and the entire collection of Notes recorded at the Constitution Convention in the Links and Downloads section. These contain the entire series of Notes on the Convention from James Madison, Rufus Kings, James McHenry, William Pierce, William Patterson, Alexander Hamilton and Robert Yates, in addition with the Journal from the Convention can be read by following this link, Federal Journal of the Convention of 1787.
James Madison
William Houstoun, from Georgia, took his seat.
The committee of the whole proceeded to the seventh resolution that a national executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national legislature for the term of—years, &c., to be ineligible thereafter, to possess the executive powers of Congress, &c.
Mr. PINCKNEY was for a vigorous executive, but was afraid the executive powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace and war, &c.; which would render the executive a monarchy of the worst kind, to wit, an elective one.
Mr. WILSON moved that the executive consist of a single person. Mr. C. PINCKNEY seconded the motion, so as to read “that a national executive, to consist of a single person, be instituted.”
A considerable pause ensuing, and the chairman asking if he should put the question, Dr. FRANKLIN observed, that it was a point of great importance, and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments on it before the question was put.
Mr. RUTLEDGE animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded, by having frankly disclosed their opinions, from afterwards changing them, which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting the executive power in a single person, though he was not for giving him the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest responsibility, and administer the public affairs best.
Mr. SHERMAN said, he considered the executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the legislature into effect; that the person or persons ought to be appointed by, and accountable to, the legislature only, which was the depository of the supreme will of the society. As they were the best judges of the business which ought to be done by the executive department, and consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it, he wished the number might not be fixed, but that the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more, as experience might dictate.
Mr. WILSON preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy, despatch, and responsibility, to the office. He did not consider the prerogatives of the British monarch as a proper guide in defining the executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a legislative nature; among others, that of war and peace, &c. The only powers he considered strictly executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to, and appointed by, the legislature.
Mr. GERRY favored the policy of annexing a council to the executive, in order to give weight and inspire confidence.
Mr. RANDOLPH strenuously opposed a unity in the executive magistracy. He regarded it as the fœtus of monarchy. We had, he said, no motive to be governed by the British government as our prototype. He did not mean, however, to throw censure on that excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy it, he did not know that he should be opposed to it; but the fixed genius of the people of America required a different form of government. He could not see why the great requisites for the executive department,—vigor, despatch, and responsibility,—could not be found in three men, as well as in one man. The executive ought to be independent. It ought, therefore, in order to support its independence, to consist of more than one.
Mr. WILSON said, that unity in the executive, instead of being the fœtus of monarchy, would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated, that he was not governed by the British model, which was inapplicable to the situation of this country, the extent of which was so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated republic would do for it.
Mr. Wilson’s motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common consent, the committee seeming unprepared for any decision on it, and the first part of the clause agreed to, viz., “that a national executive be instituted.”84
Mr. MADISON thought it would be proper, before a choice should be made between a unity and a plurality in the executive, to fix the extent of the executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature executive, and must be given to that department, whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely intrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before the committee as related to the powers of the executive should be struck out, and that after the words “that a national executive ought to be instituted,” there be inserted the words following, viz., “with power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers, ‘not legislative nor judiciary in their nature,’ as may from time to time be delegated by the national legislature.” The words “not legislative nor judiciary in their nature,” were added to the proposed amendment, in consequence of a suggestion, by Gen. PINCKNEY, that improper powers might otherwise be delegated.
Mr. WILSON seconded this motion.
Mr. PINCKNEY moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last member of it, viz., “and to execute such other powers, not legislative nor judiciary in their nature, as may from time to time be delegated.” He said they were unnecessary, the object of them being included in the “power to carry into effect the national laws.”
Mr. RANDOLPH seconded the motion.
Mr. MADISON did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words, “to appoint to offices, &c.,” the whole being, perhaps, included in the first member of the proposition. He did not, however, see any inconvenience in retaining them; and cases might happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.
In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinckney, the question on Mr. Madison’s motion was divided; and the words objected to by Mr. Pinckney struck out, by the votes of
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, and Georgia, 7, against Massachusetts, Virginia, and South Carolina, 3; the preceding part of the motion being first agreed to,—Connecticut, divided; all the other states in the affirmative.
The next clause in the seventh resolution, relating to the mode of appointing, and the duration of, the executive, being under consideration,
Mr. WILSON said, he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say, however, at least, that, in theory, he was for an election by the people. Experience, particularly in New York and Massachusetts, showed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large was both a convenient and successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety.
Mr. SHERMAN was for the appointment by the legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which was to be executed. An independence of the executive on the supreme legislature was, in his opinion, the very essence of tyranny, if there was any such thing.
Mr. WILSON moved, that the blank for the term of duration should be filled with three years, observing, at the same time, that he preferred this short period on the supposition that a reëligibility would be provided for.
Mr. PINCKNEY moved for seven years.
Mr. SHERMAN was for three years, and against the doctrine of rotation, as throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties.
Mr. MASON was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a reëligibility, as the best expedient, both for preventing the effect of a false complaisance on the side of the legislature towards unfit characters, and a temptation on the side of the executive to intrigue with the legislature for a reappointment.
Mr. BEDFORD was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven years. He begged the committee to consider what the situation of the country would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for such a period, and it should be found on trial that he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his appointment. An impeachment, he said, would be no cure for this evil, as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine years.
On the question for seven years,—
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, ay, 5; Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 4; Massachusetts, divided.
There being five ayes, four noes, and one divided, a question was asked, whether a majority had voted in the affirmative. The president decided that it was an affirmative vote.85
The mode of appointing the executive was the next question.
Mr. WILSON renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the legislature from the people, without the intervention of the state legislatures, but the executive also, in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the states.
Col. MASON favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes, however, that Mr. Wilson might have time to digest it into his own form. The clause “to be chosen by the national legislature,” was accordingly postponed.
Mr. RUTLEDGE suggests an election of the executive by the second branch only of the national legislature.
The committee then rose, and the house adjourned.
Robert Yates
Met pursuant to adjournment.
The 7th resolve, that a national executive be instituted. Agreed to.
To continue in office for seven years. Agreed to.
A general authority to execute the laws. Agreed to.
To appoint all officers not otherwise provided for. Agreed to.
Adjourned to the next day.
Rufus King
Executive power to be in one person.
Motion by Wilson Penn. Seconded by Chs. Pinckney So. Car.
Rutledge in favor of the motion.
Sherman preferred leaving the number to the Legislature.
Wilson. An Executive should possess the Power of secresy, vigour & Dispatch, and so constituted as to be responsible. Executive powers are intended for the execution of the Laws, and the appointment of officers not otherwise appointed: a single Executive may be responsible, but a numerous one cannot be responsible.
Madison agreed with Wilson in the Definition of Executive power. Ex vi termini. Executive power does not include the Power of War and Peace. Executive Power shd. be limited and defined. If large, we shall have the Evils of Elective Monarchies. Perhaps the best plan will be a single Executive of long duration, with a Council and with Liberty to dissent on his personal Responsibility.
Gerry. I am in favor of a Council to advise the Executive: they will be organs of information respecting Persons qualified for the various offices. Their opinions may be recorded, so as to be liable to be called to account & impeached-in this way, their Responsibility will be certain, and for misconduct their Punishment sure.
Dickinson. A limited yet vigorous Executive is not republican, but peculiar to monarchy-the royal Executive has vigour, not only by power, but by popular Attachment & Report-an Equivalent to popular attachment may be derived from the Veto on the Legislative acts. We cannot have a limited monarchy-our condition does not permit it. Republics are in the beginning and for a time industrious, but they finally destroy themselves because they are badly constituted. I dread the consolidation of the States, & hope for a good national Govt. from the present Division of the States with a feeble Executive.
We are to have a Legislature of two branches, or two Legislatures, as the sovereign of the nation-this will work a change unless you provide that the judiciary shall aid and correct the Executive. The first Branch of the Legislature, the H. of Representatives, must be on another plan. The second Branch or Senate may be on the present scheme of representing the States-the Representatives to be apportioned according to the Quotas of the States paid into the general Treasury. The Executive to be removed from office by the national Legislature, on the Petition of seven States.
Randolph-by a single Executive, there will be danger of Monarchy or Tyranny. If the Executive consist of three persons, they may act without danger. If of one, he will be dependent on the Legislatures & cannot be impeached till the Expiration of his Office. A single Executive against the Genius of America.
Wilson-There are two important Points to be considered, the extent of the Country & the Manners of the People of the U. S.-the former requires the Vigour of Monarchy, the latter, are against a Kingly Executive, our manners are purely republican.
Montesquieu is favorable to confederated Republics-I also am in favor of this Scheme, if we can take for its Basis, Liberty, and are able to ensure a vigourous execution of the Laws. A single executive is not so likely so soon to introduce Monarchy or Despotism, as a complex one. The People of America did not oppose the King, but the Parliament-Our opposition was not against a Unity, but a corrupt Multitude.
Williamson-There is no true difference between an Executive composed of a single person, with a Council, and an Executive composed of three or more persons.
The Question postponed.
After debating the Powers, the Committee proceeded to discuss the Duration of the Executive Power.
Wilson proposed three years, without rotation or exclusion
Madison proposed good behaviour, or Seven years with exclusion for ever afterward.
Mason-In favor of Seven years, and future ineligibility-by this Provision the executive is made independent of the Legislature, who may be his Electors-if re-elected, he will be complaisant to the Legislature to obtain their favor & his own Re-election.
On the Question for Seven years-Mass. Gerry & Strong, no. Gorham & King aye- divided. (3) Cont. N. C., S. C. & G. no. N. Y. N. J. Penn. Del. Virginia aye. 5 ayes, 4. nos-1. divided. So the blank filled.
Alexander Hamilton
1-The way to prevent a majority from having an interest to oppress the minority is to enlarge the sphere.
2-Elective Monarchies turbulent and unhappy- Madison
Men unwilling to admit so decided a superiority of merit in an individual as to accede to his appointment to so preeminent a station-
If several are admitted as there will be many competitors of equal merit they may be all included-contention prevented-and the republican genius consulted-
I Situation of this Country peculiar- Randoph
II Taught the people an ervasion to Monarchy-
III All their constitutions opposed to it-
IV Fixed character of the people opposed to it-
V If proposed twill prevent a fair discussion of the plan.
VI Why cannot three execute? -Great exertions only requisite on particular occasions. View [or voice] of america
-Legislature may appoint a dictator when necessary- Safety to liberty the great object
-Seeds of destruction-Slaves-[former Continental army struck out] might be safely enlisted-
-May appoint men devoted to them-and even bribe the legislature by offices-
-Chief Magistrate must be free from impeachment extent-manners- Wilson
Confederated republic unites advantages and banishes disadvantages of other kinds of governments-
rendering the executive ineligible an infringement of the right of election-
peculiar talents requisite for executive, therefore ought to be opportunity of ascertaining his talents-therefore frequent change- Bedford
Princ 1 The further men are from the ultimate point of importance the readier they will be [to] concur in a change-
2 Civilization approximates the different species of governments-
3-Vigour is the result of several principles-Activity wisdom-confidence-
4-Extent of limits will occasion the non attendance of remote members and tend to throw the government into the hands of the Country near the seat of government-a reason for strengthening the upper branch and multiplying the Inducements to attendance-
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