On June 1, 1787 the Convention debated the Executive, what will become the President, as part of the 7th resolution of the Virginia Plan. The Convention settled very little, whether the Executive would be a single person or a plural executive of three was still open as was the method of selection. Basic powers in law enforcement was agreed to as was a seven year term. June 2nd would continue the debate of the executive into some finer details, these finer details will eventually help resolve the issue from the first in a singular or plural executive and mode of selection.
James Madison notes three new delegates to the Convention this day, eleven states remain represented (New Hampshire and Rhode Island are not). James McHenry (Maryland) has left the Convention due to his brothers grave illness. He will not return until August 4, 1787.
- Connecticut; William Samuel Johnson
- Maryland; Daniel of St. Thomas Jennifer
- New York; John Lansing jr.
The day starts out with the Convention in the Committee of the Whole, where it was moved and seconded by Edmund Randolph (Virginia) to postpone discussion of the executive in order to take up the Second Branch of the Legislature. This motion was defeated 7-3. Yea-3 (NY, PA, MD), Nay-7 (MA, CT, DE, VA, NC, SC, GA). Discussion of the Executive resumes, with the method of appointment by the National Legislature carrying from June 1, 1787.
James Wilson proposes an Electoral method
James Wilson (Pennsylvania) proposes a creative method for appoint the magistrate through elections.
That the states be divided into—districts, and that the persons qualified to vote in each district for members of the first branch of the national legislature elect—members for their respective districts to be electors of the executive magistracy: that the said electors of the executive magistracy meet at—, and they, or any—of them, so met, shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body,—person—in whom the executive authority of the national government shall be vested.
This is the beginnings of what will become the Electoral College that will ultimately become the method of electing a President. Though it does have significant difference of groups of states made into districts, the concept of the people choosing electors whom will vote for the executive is presented.
Following his proposal James Wilson repeats his arguments of being in favor of an election without having the States involved in the process, and believes this method not only achieves this, but will instill confidence among the people in the magistrate, rather than by being appointed by the National Legislature. Elbridge Gerry (Massachusetts) also opposed election by the National Legislature, feeling it would create a conflict and lead to buying or bargaining for votes, “Votes would be given by the former under promises or expectations, from the latter, of recompensing them by services to members of the legislature or their friends”. He liked the principle of Wilson’s proposals, but felt leaving the States out of it would make it much more difficult for them to accept. He did not feel the United States was ready to strip the States of their power, and felt the people will deicide when they feel it is time or necessary. But Gerry was also not sure if the people ought to even directly elect electors, he felt the people are, “being too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to deceptions”. Hugh Williamson (North Carolina) sees no advantage of using electors chosen by the people since they would stand in the same relation as the State Legislatures, and while expedient would be troublesome and expensive to actually do.
On the James Wilson’s proposal of a electoral type method for choosing the Executive, was defeated 8-2 (or 7-2-1). Yea-2; (PA, MD), Nay-8 (7) (MA, CT, DE, VA, NC, SC, GA) New York in James Madison Notes is listed Yea, in the Federal Journal is listed as divided. New York’s actual vote of Yea or Split has no consequence is the final approval of James Wilson’s motion.
The Legislature appointing the Executive
After defeating James Wilson’s proposal, the Convention than agreed to, “electing the executive, by the national legislature, for the term of seven years”, 8-2. Yea-8; (MA, CT, NY, DE, VA, NC, SC, GA), Nay-2 (PA, MD).
Compensation for the Executive
The Convention next took up compensation as seen in the 7th Resolution in the Virginia Plan,
a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the magistracy existing at the time of increase or diminution
Benjamin Franklin (Pennsylvania) who was 81 by this time, was weak in body and voice, but not in mind. After reviewing the Virginia Plan submitted on May 29, 1787 he had concerns about compensation and wrote a letter to the Convention, which was read by fellow Pennsylvanian James Wilson.
“Sir: It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to the honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it success. In this particular of salaries to the executive branch, I happen to differ; and as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty, that I hazard it. The committee will judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may possibly change mine. I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but, on the contrary, great advantages.
“Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of power, and the love of money. Separately, each of these has great force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such men a post of honor, that shall be at the same time a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it is that renders the British government so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions which are perpetually dividing the nation, distracting its councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless and mischievous wars, and often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of peace.
“And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable preëminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your government, and be your rulers. And these, too, will be mistaken in the expected happiness of their situation; for their vanquished competitors, of the same spirit, and from the same motives, will perpetually be endeavoring to distress their administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to the people.
“Besides these evils, sir, though we may set out in the beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more to them. Hence, as all history informs us, there has been in every state and kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the governing and governed, the one striving to obtain more for its support, and the other to pay less. And this has alone occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the princes or enslaving of the people. Generally, indeed, the ruling power carries its point, the revenues of princes constantly increasing; and we see that they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes, the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his partisans, and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in a hundred, who would not, if he could, follow the example of Pharaoh—get first all the people’s money, then all their lands, and then make them and their children servants forever. It will be said, that we don’t propose to establish kings. I know it: but there is a natural inclination in mankind to kingly government. It sometimes relieves them from aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among citizens, and that they like. I am apprehensive, therefore, perhaps too apprehensive, that the government of these states may in future times end in a monarchy. But this catastrophe I think may be long delayed, if in our proposed system we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction, and tumult, by making our posts of honor places of profit. If we do, I fear that, though we do employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number will in time be set aside; it will only nourish the fœtus of a king, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly expressed it, and a king will the sooner be set over us.
“It may be imagined by some that this is a Utopian idea, and that we can never find men to serve us in the executive department without paying them well for their services. I conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The high sheriff of a county, in England, is an honorable office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive, and therefore not sought for. But yet it is executed, and well executed, and usually by some of the principal gentlemen of the county. In France, the office of counsellor, or member of their judiciary parliament, is more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a high price: there are, indeed, fees on the law proceedings, which are divided among them; but these fees do not amount to more than three per cent. on the sum paid for the place. Therefore, as legal interest is there at five per cent., they in fact pay two per cent. for being allowed to do the judiciary business of the nation, which is, at the same time, entirely exempt from the burden of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not, however, mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our judiciary department. I only bring the instance to show, that the pleasure of doing good and serving their country, and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their time to the public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction.
“Another instance is that of a respectable society who have made the experiment, and practised it with success more than one hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with them, that they are not to go to law; but in their controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly, and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences. In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty, and the respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed, but it is never made profitable by salaries, fees, or perquisites. And, indeed, in all cases of public service, the less the profit the greater the honor.
“To bring the matter nearer home: Have we not seen the greatest and most important of our offices, that of general of our armies, executed, for eight years together, without the smallest salary, by a patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; and this through fatigues and distresses, in common with the other brave men, his military friends and companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding three or four men, in all the United States, with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful council for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed? Sir, I have a better opinion of our country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and faithfully the office in question.
“Sir, the saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted, I must be contented with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly, and done my duty.” (sic)
Benjamin Franklin was concerned the by paying the Executive (as well as any public office) would turn the office from a place of honor to serve, to a place of profit for exploit. He felt only men who wished to have the honor to serve their country and countrymen should hold these offices, and by not paying them, only those type of men would pursue them. By making them a place of profit, though it the salary may start out small the ability to raise it will also exist, those who are seeking profit and power would be the ones to pursue these offices. He sites examples to support this of both service with and without compensation.
Alexander Hamilton (New York) seconds Benjamin Franklin’s motion to have no compensation for the Executive. No debate ensued, and the motion was postponed for consideration by the members. “It was treated with great respect, but rather for the author of it than from any apparent conviction of its expediency or practicability”.
Removal of the Executive, length of term and the point of Limited Monarchy
John Dickinson (Delaware) moves for the following motion, which was seconded by Gunning Bedford jr. (Delaware).
“that the executive be made removable by the national legislature, on the request of a majority of the legislatures of individual states.”
John Dickinson, felt it necessary to place the power of removing the Executive somewhere, and did not like the plan of impeaching officers of the state. He can not think of a plan of removal that would work better, he had no intention of abolishing the States as some seem inclined, and this empowers the States.
Roger Sherman (Connecticut) contends the National Executive should have the power to remove the Executive at their pleasure. George Mason (Virginia) feels it is needed to have some mode of removing the Executive who is unfit, but is opposed to making the Executive a creature of the Legislature, this would be a violation of the fundamental principle of a good government.
James Madison and James Wilson felt uneasy about including the States.
“that it would enable a minority of the people to prevent the removal of an officer who had rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open a door for intrigues against him in states where his administration, though just, might be unpopular; and might tempt him to pay court to particular states whose leading partisans he might fear, or wish to engage as his partisans”.
James Madison and James Wilson’s concerns are that the executive will attempt to basically bribe enough of the States to prevent impeachment. They were also concerned that with each State having an equal vote, it would enable a small minority to prevent to removal of the executive who may be acting to the contrary of the great majority of the people. This again brings up the issue of State suffrage in voting and representation.
John Dickinson considered this motion of such importance he urged that no man should be silent or reserved from speaking about it. He contends the independence of all three branches were absolutely needed, “but that such an executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent with a republic; that a firm executive could only exist in a limited monarchy”. Stability will be offered by a bicameral legislature, and the division of the Nation into States, and “This division ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left with the states”. Dickinson states, “A limited monarchy he considered as one of the best governments in the world. It was not certain that the same blessings were derivable from any other form”. But he concedes a limited monarchy can not be accomplished, since a House of nobles and aristocracy was essential to one, none of which can exist in this Country. He goes on to State,
If ancient republics have been found to flourish for a moment only, and then vanish forever, it only proves that they were badly constituted, and that we ought to seek for every remedy for their diseases. One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky division of this country into distinct states—a division which some seemed desirous to abolish altogether.
He hoped that each State would retain an equal voice, at least in one branch of the National Legislature, but supposed the sums paid would be a better ratio for the other branch.
John Dickinson’s desire is to establish a re form of Federalism, basically breaking the power up between multiple levels. This concept of federalism will become instrumental in parts of the Constitution and debates in the Convention. Though his idea will not become part of the Constitution, the desire to ensure the States have a stake in the constitution will become essential to building the Federal System.
A motion being made to strike out “on request by a majority of the legislatures of the individual states,” and rejected, 7-3, Yea-3; (CT, SC, GA), Nay-7 (MA, NY, PA, DE, MD, VA, NC)1. The question was taken on Mr. Dickinson’s motion, “for making the executive removable by the national legislature at the request of a majority of state legislatures,” which was also rejected, 9-1. All the states being in the Nay, except Delaware, which was Yea. [The Yea votes are based on Federal Journal only recording the first vote in which 10 states voted].
On the question of making the Executive ineligible after seven years was agreed to 7-2-1, Yea-7 (MA, NY, DE, MD, VA, NC, SC); Nay-2 (CT, GA); Split-1 (PA).
Immediately following the agreement to limit the Executive to one Seven year term, Hugh Williamson (North Carolina) moved to add, “and to be removable on impeachment and conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty;”. This was seconded by William Davie (North Carolina) and agreed to nem con.
Single or Plural executive
John Rutledge (South Carolina) and James Wilson moved to fill in the blank for the number of person for the Executive with one. The believe the reason are so obvious, that no member would oppose the motion. However Edmund Randolph quickly challenged that notion, and opposed the eagerness to answer this question by Rutledge and Wilson. He made four points in favor of a plural executive.
- first, that the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of monarchy;
- secondly, that a unity was unnecessary, a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of the department;
- thirdly, that the necessary confidence would never be reposed in a single magistrate;
- fourthly, that the appointments would generally be in favor of some inhabitant near the centre of the community, and consequently the remote parts would not be on an equal footing
Edmund Randolph was still in favor or a plural executive of three, drawn different regions of the Nation. Randolph is concerned with even the appearance of a monarchy in the new system of government, a plurality would gain the confidence in the people, and by ensuring a vested interest by all in the executive, and ensure all regions of the Nation had an equal footing and position within the executive.
Pierce Butler (South Carolina) strongly favored a single executive. Butler argues that a single Executive be responsible to the whole nation, and not partial to the interest of a portion of it. If three or more were to be executive, it would end up in a constant struggle between the competing regions of the Nation, and in Military matter would create substantial problems. He cites Holland as an example of multiple person being in charge of the military, “seeing the manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted Holland, when threatened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for directing the force to the defence of this part, another to that part of the country, just as he happened to be swayed by prejudice or interest”. By having this conflict, the Commander of one region, which he had a vested interest in, would be willing to sacrifice another region which he had not a vested interest in.
James Wilson and John Rutledge's motion was postponed. Charles Pinckney (South Carolina) gave notice he wished to reconsider the mode of election for the first branch, pursuant to the rules agreed upon for the Convention (May 28, 1787) and the Convention adjourned until Monday, June 4, 1787.
Summary
This day consisted of several topics discussed, but in the end nothing decided this day would end up in the final draft of the Constitution. The concept of the electoral College is presented by James Wilson, though not agreed to the concept of his proposal will become the heart of the actual method of choosing the President. Benjamin franklin gives a passionate plea for no compensation for the Executive, which is postponed.
The Convention debates a type of impeachment process for the executive, when called upon by a majority of the States, which is defeated, but does offer a glimpse of the desire to be able to remove the executive, and also reflects the desire among some of ensuring the Federal system.
The executive is finally limited to a single 7 year term, neither provision of which will survive the summer. Finally the issue of a single or plural executive was again discussed, though briefly and once again postponed.
1: http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(ed00179))
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